We consider the problem of private function evaluation (PFE) in the two-party setting. Here, informally, one party holds an input x while the other holds a circuit describing a function f ; the goal is for one (or both) of the parties to learn f (x) while revealing nothing more to either party. In contrast to the usual setting of secure computation -where the function being computed is known to both parties -PFE is useful in settings where the function (i.e., algorithm) itself must remain secret, e.g., because it is proprietary or classified.
Introduction
In the setting of two-party private function evaluation (PFE), a party P 1 holds an input x while another party P 2 holds a (circuit C f describing a) function f ; the goal is for one (or both) of the parties to learn the result f (x) while not revealing to either party any information beyond this. (The parties do agree in advance on the size of the circuit being computed, as well as the input/output length. See Section 2.1 for further discussion.) PFE is useful when the function being computed must remain private, say because the function is classified, because revealing the function would lead to security vulnerabilities, or because the implementation of the function (e.g., the circuit C f itself) is proprietary even if the function f is known [33, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 19, 5, 32, 30, 3] .
PFE stands in contrast to the standard setting of secure two-party computation [36, 14] , where the parties hold inputs x and y, respectively, and wish to compute the result f (x, y) for some mutually known function f using an agreed-upon circuit C f for computing f . On the other hand, it is well known that the problem of PFE can be reduced to the problem of secure computation using universal circuits. In more detail, let U n be some (fixed) universal circuit such that U n (x, C) = C(x) for every circuit C having at most n gates. (We implicitly assume here some fixed representation for circuits.) Then if C n is the class of circuits having at most n gates, PFE for this class is solved by having the parties run a (standard) secure computation of U n .
Contributions of our Work
We show the first constant-round PFE protocols with linear complexity, without relying on fully homomorphic public-key encryption. 1 We begin by showing a protocol in the semi-honest setting; this illustrates our core techniques and represents what we consider to be our main contribution. (Semi-honest security was the focus of all prior work on PFE [33, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 19, 5, 32, 30, 3] .) Zero-knowledge proofs can be used in the standard way [15] to obtain security against malicious parties, still in constant rounds and with linear complexity; however, the resulting protocol is unlikely in practice to out-perform secure computation of universal circuits using efficient protocols for the malicious setting (e.g., [23] ). We sketch a more efficient construction for achieving security against a malicious P 1 .
Our protocols rely on (singly) homomorphic public-key encryption and symmetric-key encryption secure against linear related-key attacks; see Definition 3. The former can be instantiated using various standard cryptosystems (e.g., [10, 29] ); the latter can be instantiated in the random oracle model, or in a provable sense [2] based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
In addition to the theoretical improvement, we believe our approach will yield better performance in practice for PFE of large circuits and/or in certain settings. Specifically, although our protocol uses O(n) public-key operations -in contrast to universal-circuit-based approaches that would use O(n log n) or O(n log 2 n) symmetric-key operations 2 -the protocol has linear communication complexity, making it advantageous when network communication is expensive. Moreover, there are several ways our protocol can be improved (e.g., using elliptic-curve cryptography with fast algorithms for multiple fixed-base exponentiations) to reduce its computational cost.
Overview of our Techniques
Our main technical contribution, as noted above, is our idea for achieving PFE with linear complexity in the semi-honest setting; we describe this here. Our description is fairly detailed and we will refer to it in the formal description of our protocol later; it should also be possible to skim this section so as to obtain the main ideas. Our approach adapts Yao's garbled-circuit technique. At a very high level, our idea is to have P 1 generate a sequence of gates; P 2 then connects these gates together, using (singly) homomorphic encryption, in a manner that is oblivious to P 1 , while still enabling P 1 to prepare a garbled circuit corresponding to the circuit C f held by P 2 . This idea of having one party connect gates of the circuit together is vaguely reminiscent of the "soldering" approach taken in [28] ; our setting, however, is different than theirs (in [28] it was required that both parties know the circuit being computed), as is our implementation of the "soldering" step.
Say x ∈ {0, 1} , and assume that f outputs a single bit and that C f is known to contain exactly n nand gates. (Neither of these assumptions is necessary, but we avoid complications for now.) It will be useful to distinguish between outgoing wires and ingoing wires of a circuit. Outgoing wires include the input wires of the circuit, along with the wire that exits each gate of the circuit; thus, in a circuit with inputs and n gates there are exactly + n outgoing wires. The ingoing wires are exactly the input wires to each gate of the circuit; thus, in a circuit with n two-input gates there are exactly 2n ingoing wires. A circuit is defined by specifying the output wires, and by giving a correspondence between outgoing wires and ingoing wires; e.g., specifying that outgoing wire i (which may be an input wire or a wire exiting some gate) connects to ingoing wires j, k, and . We stress that even though we speak of each internal gate as having only a single outgoing wire, we handle arbitrary fan-out since a single outgoing wire can be connected to several ingoing wires.
In our description below, we assume for concreteness that P 2 learns the output f (x). However, it is trivial to modify our protocol (with no additional cost) so that only P 1 learns the output. See the remark at the end of this section.
The protocol begins by having P 1 generate and send a public key pk for a (singly) homomorphic encryption scheme Enc. Similar to Yao's garbled-circuit technique, P 1 then chooses + n pairs of random keys that will be assigned to each of the outgoing wires. Let ) . We include it above for clarity.) P 2 , in turn, obliviously defines keys for each of the 2n ingoing wires. P 2 sorts the gates of C f topologically, so that if the outgoing wire from some gate i connects to an ingoing wire of some gate j then i < j. This defines a natural enumeration of the outgoing wires in the circuit: outgoing wires numbered from 1 to correspond to the input wires of the circuit, and outgoing wire + i (for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) corresponds to the wire exiting gate i. The output wire of the circuit corresponds to outgoing wire + n. (Recall that here we assume f is boolean; in Section 3.1 we relax this.)
For each ingoing wire of the circuit, P 2 does as follows. Say the ingoing wire of some gate i is connected to outgoing wire j. Then P 2 chooses random a i , b i and defines the (encrypted) keys for this ingoing wire to be Expanding upon the above, say gate i of the circuit has its left ingoing wire connected to outgoing wire j and right ingoing wire connected to outgoing wire k. (As always, the outgoing wire from this gate is numbered + i.) Then P 2 defines the encrypted "garbled gate" Upon receiving this message, P 1 decrypts each encGG to obtain, for each gate i, the three pairs
. It then prepares a garbled version GG i of this gate in the usual way: namely, it computes the four ciphertexts
(where sEnc denotes a symmetric-key encryption scheme), and sets GG i to be the four ciphertexts C 0,0 , . . . , C 1,1 in random permuted order. P 1 sends GG 1 , . . . , GG n to P 2 . In addition, P 1 sends the appropriate input-wire keys s
x , as well as both output-wire keys s 0 +n , s 1 +n . P 2 now has enough information to compute the result, using a procedure analogous (but not identical) to what is done in a standard application of Yao's garbled-circuit methodology. P 2 begins knowing a key s i for each outgoing wire i ∈ {1, . . . , }. (Recall these are the input wires of the circuit that correspond to P 1 's input.) Inductively, P 2 can compute a key for every outgoing wire as follows: Consider the ( + i)th outgoing wire exiting from gate i, where the left ingoing wire to this gate is connected to outgoing wire j < i and the right ingoing wire to this gate is connected to outgoing wire k < i. Assume P 2 has already determined keys s j , s k for outgoing wires j, k, respectively. P 2 computes keys L i = a i s j + b i and R i = a i s k + b i for the left and right ingoing wires to gate i. Then P 2 tries to decrypt each of the four ciphertexts in GG i . With overwhelming probability, only one of these decryptions will be successful; the result of this successful decryption defines the key s +i for outgoing wire + i. Once P 2 has determined key s +n , it can check whether this corresponds to an output of '0' or '1' using the ordered pair s 0 +n , s 1 +n sent by P 1 . Further details, intuition for security of the above, proofs of security, and extensions to handle malicious behavior of P 1 are described in the sections that follow. A more efficient variant of the above protocol is described in Section 3.2.
Remark 1: It is trivial to modify the above protocol, at no additional cost, so that only P 1 learns the output (and P 2 learns nothing): first, change round 3 so that P 1 does not send the output-wire keys s 0 +n , s 1 +n . Then when P 2 learns the final key s +n it simply sends this key back to P 1 , who can then check whether it is equal to s 0 +n or s 1 +n .
Other Related Work
Several works have explored weaker variants of PFE. Paus et al. [30] consider semi-private function evaluation where the circuit topology (i.e., the connections between gates) is assumed to be known to both parties, but the boolean function computed by each gate can be hidden. Here we treat the more difficult case where everything about the circuit (except an upper bound on its size and the number of inputs/outputs) is hidden. Another direction has been to consider PFE for limited classes of functions: e.g., functions defined by low-depth circuits [33, 4] , branching programs [19, 3] , or polynomials [9, 27] . Here we handle functions defined by arbitrary (polynomial-size) circuits.
Definitions
We denote the security parameter by k. 
Private Function Evaluation
Our definitions of security are standard, but we include them here for completeness. For simplicity, we treat the case where P 1 holds some value x ∈ {0, 1} as input while P 2 holds a circuit C f computing some deterministic function f ; the goal of the protocol is for P 2 to learn f (x). The definitions we provide here, as well as our protocols, extend rather easily to handle, e.g., additional input provided by P 2 (this can simply be incorporated into the circuit C f ), randomized functions f , or the case where P 1 is to receive output (see Remark 1 at the end of Section 1.2). The problem of PFE is meaningless in practice if P 2 learns the output and f (resp., C f ) is allowed to be completely arbitrary: in that case P 2 could take f (x) = x and learn P 1 's entire input! It is thus reasonable to impose some restrictions on C f . The most general formulation is to assume that both parties fix some class C of circuits, and require that C f ∈ C; in that case we refer to the problem as C-PFE. This encompasses both the case when P 1 knows some partial information about f (as in [30] ), as well as the case where C f is restricted in some way (e.g., to have low depth). In this work, we assume only that P 1 knows the input length , and upper bounds on the output length m and the number of gates n (i.e., C contains only circuits satisfying those constraints). Note that if m then meaningful privacy of P 1 's input is maintained regardless of what circuit C f ∈ C is used by P 2 .
There are two ways one could incorporate a security parameter into the definition of the problem. The usual way, which we find less natural in our setting, is to allow the sizes of the inputs to grow and to set the security parameter equal to the input size(s). We prefer instead to treat the input domains (namely, {0, 1} and some class of circuits C) as fixed, and to treat the security parameter k as an additional input.
A two-party protocol for C-PFE is a protocol running in polynomial time and satisfying the following correctness requirement: if party P 1 , holding input 1 k and x, and party P 2 , holding input 1 k and C f ∈ C, run the protocol honestly, then (except with probability negligible in k) the output of P 2 is C f (x).
Security in the semi-honest case. In the semi-honest case we assume both parties follow the protocol honestly but may each try to learn some additional information from their (respective) view. Fix C and let Π be a protocol for C-PFE. The view of the ith party during an execution of Π when the parties begin holding inputs x and C f , respectively, and security parameter 1 k is denoted by view Π i (1 k , x, C f ). The view of P i contains P i 's input and random tape, along with the sequence of messages received from the other party P 3−i .
When f is deterministic it suffices to consider the views of the parties in isolation without considering the joint distribution with the output [14, Sect. 7.2.2.1]. We thus have:
Security against malicious behavior. We define security for a malicious adversary via the usual real/ideal framework [14] . We tailor our definition to the case of a malicious P 1 ; the case of a malicious P 2 is exactly analogous. Let Π be a protocol for C-PFE, and let A be a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time machine corrupting P 1 and holding auxiliary input z. We let view Π A(z) (1 k , x, C f ) be the random variable denoting the entire view of the adversary following an execution of Π with the indicated inputs, and let out Π A(z) (1 k , x, C f ) be the random variable denoting the output of the honest party P 2 after this execution. Set
An ideal execution of C-PFE proceeds as follows:
Inputs: P 1 and P 2 hold inputs x ∈ {0, 1} and C f ∈ C, respectively; the adversary A (who corrupts P 1 ) also has 1 k and z as inputs.
Send inputs to trusted party: P 2 sends C f to the trusted party. A sends a value x ∈ {0, 1} (if A sends nothing, or some x ∈ {0, 1} , then some default input in {0, 1} is used instead).
Trusted party sends outputs: The trusted party computes C f (x) and sends the result to P 2 . The honest P 2 outputs what it was sent by the trusted party, and A outputs an arbitrary (probabilistic polynomial-time computable) function of its view.
We let view PFE A(z) (1 k , x, C f ) denote the output of A, and out PFE A(z) (1 k , x, C f ) denote the output of P 2 , following an execution in the ideal model as described above. Set
Definition 2 Protocol Π is a secure C-PFE protocol for a malicious P 1 if it is a secure C-PFE protocol for semi-honest adversaries and if, in addition, for every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A corrupting P 1 in the real model there exists a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary S in the ideal model such that
ideal PFE S(z) (1 k , x, C f ) k∈N, x∈{0,1} , C f ∈C, z∈{0,1} * c ≡ real Π A(z) (1 k , x, C f ) k∈N, x∈{0,1} , C f ∈C, z∈{0,1} * .
Tools
Our protocol uses a (singly) homomorphic public-key encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec). The actual property we need is the ability to evaluate a pairwise-independent function on the plaintext space. If the plaintext space is a group G of prime order p, written additively, this can be achieved by mapping a ∈ Z p , b ∈ G, and Enc pk (m) to a (random) encryption of Enc pk (am + b). Thus, e.g., standard El Gamal encryption [10] can be used (though G in that case is sometimes written multiplicatively). In fact, the plaintext space is not required to have prime order, as we only require "almost" pairwise-independence. In particular, Paillier encryption [29] could also be used.
We also use a symmetric-key encryption scheme (sEnc, sDec) whose key space is viewed as a group G(k) of order p = p(k) that is, for simplicity, the same as the plaintext space of the public-key encryption scheme being used. (In practice, this can be achieved for any desired G by implementing encryption with key g ∈ G using AES with key SHA-1(g), truncated to 128 bits.) We impose the same requirements on (sEnc, sDec) as in [24] : namely, that it have elusive and efficiently verifiable range. (These properties are easily satisfied.) In addition, we require (sEnc, sDec) to satisfy a weak form of related-key security where, roughly, encryption remains secure even when performed using linearly related keys (where the linear relations are chosen at random). That is: 
We remark that a weaker definition (where A queries each sEnc c a i s+b i (·, ·) only on two inputs, chosen nonadaptively) suffices for our proof. It is easy to construct an encryption scheme satisfying the above definition using a (non-programmable) random oracle, and it would be surprising if standard encryption schemes based on AES could be shown not to satisfy the above definition. Moreover, recent work of Applebaum et al. [2] can be used to construct a scheme satisfying the above definition in a provable sense, based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
A C-PFE Protocol for Semi-Honest Adversaries

Description of the Protocol
We now formally define our C-PFE protocol for semi-honest adversaries. In our description here, we assume the reader is familiar with the protocol overview provided in Section 1.2.
We assume that all circuits in C are composed solely of nand gates. This is for simplicity only, and our protocol can be easily modified to handle circuits over an arbitrary basis of 2-to-1 gates with only a small impact on the efficiency. Let n be an upper bound on the size of any circuit in C, and let m be an upper bound on the number of outputs. By adjusting n appropriately, we may assume that every circuit in C has exactly m outputs (P 2 can always add "dummy" outputs that are fixed to some constant); that the output wires of the circuit do not connect to any other gates (this can be achieved by adding at most m gates to the circuit); and that every circuit in C contains exactly n gates (P 2 can add "dummy" gates whose output wires are connected to nothing). We make all these assumptions in what follows. We also assume that P 2 learns the output; however, it is trivial to modify the protocol so that P 1 learns the output; see Remark 1 in Section 1.2.
Recall from Section 1.2 that we distinguish between outgoing wires and ingoing wires of C f . (Recall also that although each gate has only a single outgoing wire, we handle circuits with arbitrary fan-out since a single outgoing wire can be connected to several ingoing wires.) As in Section 1.2, party P 2 sorts the gates of C f topologically and this defines an enumeration of the N def = + n outgoing wires. The outgoing wires numbered from 1 to correspond to the input wires of the circuit, and outgoing wire + i (for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) corresponds to the output wire from gate i. The output wires of the circuit correspond to the m outgoing wires N − m + 1, . . . , N .
It will be useful to define some notation before we describe the protocol. We define an algorithm encYao that prepares garbled gates as in Yao's protocol: encYao takes as input three pairs of keys and outputs four ciphertexts, and is defined as
, where the four ciphertexts are in random permuted order. We analogously define an algorithm decYao that takes as input two keys (for each of two ingoing wires) and a garbled gate, and outputs a key for the outgoing wire; this algorithm, given keys L, R and four
for all i and outputs the unique non-⊥ value that is obtained. (If more than one non-⊥ value results, this algorithm outputs ⊥.) Our protocol is described in Figure 1 . It is not difficult to see that correctness holds with all but negligible probability, via an argument similar to the one in [24] .
In our description of the protocol we have aimed for clarity rather than efficiency, and several improvements are possible. For one, P 2 need not include Enc pk (s 0 +i ), Enc pk (s 1 +i ) as part of encGG i since P 1 already knows these values. Furthermore, P 1 need not send the encrypted values
in round 1 (since these outgoing wires do not connect to any ingoing wires). Moreover, P 1 can simply set s 0
and then there is no need to send the output-wires message in the third round); that is, for the gates whose outgoing wires are the output of the circuit, P 1 can encrypt the wire value itself rather than encrypting a key that encodes the wire value.
Security against a semi-honest P 1 is easy to see. In fact, security in that case holds in a statistical sense. Indeed, with all but negligible probability it holds that s 0 i = s 1 i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N }. Assuming this to be the case, the top two rows of each encGG i sent by P 2 to P 1 in round 2 consist only of (random) encryptions of the four independent, uniform values
In particular, these values are independent of the interconnections between gates of C f , and thus the view of P 1 is independent of the circuit held by P 2 .
Inputs: The security parameter is k. The input of P 1 is a value x ∈ {0, 1} , and the input of P 2 is a circuit C f with , n, m as described in the text. 
using the homomorphic properties of Enc. (In the above, each ciphertext is re-randomized in the usual way.) Then P 2 sends encGG 1 , . . . , encGG n to P 1 .
Round 3
For i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, party P 1 decrypts encGG i using sk to obtain the three pairs of keys Security against a semi-honest P 2 holds computationally, assuming semantic security of the homomorphic encryption scheme and security against linear related-key attacks for the symmetrickey encryption scheme. Roughly, the initial encryptions sent to P 2 in round 1 do not reveal anything about the values s 0 i , s 1 i that P 1 assigns to each outgoing wire in the circuit. Thus, the information sent to P 2 in round 3 is essentially equivalent to the information sent to P 2 in a standard application of Yao's garbled-circuit methodology, with the only difference being that here ingoing wires and outgoing wires have different keys, and P 2 must compute a key L i on some ingoing wire by "translating" one of the keys s j on the outgoing wire connected to that ingoing wire.
Theorem 4
Assume the homomorphic encryption scheme used is semantically secure, and the symmetric-key encryption scheme used is secure against linear related-key attacks (as in Definition 3) and has elusive and efficiently verifiable range. Then the protocol of Figure 1 is a secure C-PFE protocol for semi-honest adversaries.
Proof: We start by proving security for a semi-honest P 1 , which is the easier case. 
it gives encGG 1 , . . . , encGG n to P 1 as the 2nd-round message of P 2 . This completes the simulation. Note that the simulator aborts with only negligible probability. We claim that conditioned on the simulator's not aborting, the simulation is perfect. Indeed, when the simulator does not abort we have s 0 i = s 1 i for all i. In a real execution of the protocol, each encrypted garbled gate would be computed by P 2 as (2) are distributed identically to encrypted garbled gates computed as in (1) . Taking into account the negligible probability with which S 1 aborts, we see that the output of S 1 is statistically close to P 1 's view in a real execution.
We next describe a simulator S 2 who is to simulate the view of a semi-honest P 2 . The simulator is given 1 k , C f , and y = C f (x), and does as follows. First, it chooses a uniform random tape for P 2 ; this defines a i , b i , a i , b i for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The simulator runs Gen(1 k ) to obtain (pk, sk), and then sets C 0 i , C 1 i ← Enc pk (0) for i ∈ {1, . . . , N }. (The 0 here denotes some "all-0 message" of the appropriate length in the underlying plaintext space. It does not really matter what plaintext is encrypted here, as long as its length matches the key length of the symmetric-key scheme.) S 2 gives pk and C 0 1 , C 1 1 , . . . , C 0 N , C 1 N to P 2 as the first-round message of the protocol. For the third-round message of the protocol, S 2 must simulate a garbling of each gate in C f . This is done similarly to the approach taken in [24] , modifying their simulation appropriately for our setting. For each outgoing wire i ∈ {1, . . . , N } in the circuit, S 2 chooses two random keys s i , s i . Then for each gate i ∈ {1, . . . , n} the simulator does the following. Say the left ingoing wire of gate i is connected to outgoing wire j, and the right ingoing wire of gate i is connected to outgoing wire k. (As always, the outgoing wire from gate i is numbered + i.) Then S 2 computes
followed by
(The four ciphertexts are in random permuted order. The proof that the simulated view of P 2 is computationally indistinguishable from the view of P 2 in a real execution of the protocol is very similar, at least at a high level, to the proof given in [24] . Fix some x and C f for the remainder of the discussion. Let H denote the distribution of P 2 's view in a real execution of the protocol on those inputs. Define a distribution H as follows: in round 1, random values {s
are chosen as in the real protocol, but the ciphertexts sent in the first round are all encryptions of 0. The third-round message, however, is constructed honestly using the {s 0 i ,
values chosen by the honest P 2 . That is, for each gate i whose left ingoing wire is connected to outgoing wire j, and whose right ingoing wire is connected to outgoing wire k, the keys
and then the garbled gate
is computed. The third-round message is GG 1 , . . . , GG n , the input-wire keys s Before continuing, we define a notion of active/inactive keys exactly as in [24] . Consider the (normal) evaluation of C f (x). If the value on a given wire i in this evaluation is the bit b, then we say the corresponding outgoing wire key s b i is active while s
is inactive. We now define a sequence of distributions H 0 , . . . , H n . In each of these distributions random values
are chosen as in H, H , and the ciphertexts sent in the first round are all encryptions of 0 as in H . In distribution H i , the final n−i garbled gates are computed "normally", as in H and H . (Recall the gates are sorted in topological order.) The first i garbled gates, however, are computed as in (4), but encrypting the active key on the relevant outgoing wire in each case; i.e., for gate j ∈ {1, . . . , i} where key s b +j is active, compute
The third round message is thus GG 1 , . . . , GG i , GG i+1 , . . . , GG n , along with the input-wire keys and output-wire keys as in H, H . Note that H 0 is identical to H . Furthermore, as in [24] , distribution H n is identical to the simulated view output by S 2 . Thus, the proof is complete once we show that H i−1 is computationally indistinguishable from H i for all i. Computational indistinguishability of H i−1 and H i follows roughly as in [24] , except that in our case we need to rely on the security of the symmetric-key encryption scheme against linear related-key attacks. Details follow.
Fix some i * , and say the left ingoing wire of gate i * is connected to outgoing wire j, and the right ingoing wire of gate i * is connected to outgoing wire j . Furthermore, let d and d denote the out-degree of wires j and j , respectively; i.e., d is the number of ingoing wires that are connected to outgoing wire j, and d is the number of ingoing wires that are connected to outgoing wire j . Consider an adversary A as in Definition 3, who is given two tuples (â 1 ,b 1 , . . . ,â d ,b d ) and (â 1 ,b 1 , . . . ,â d ,b d ) , and access to two sets of oracles {sEnc
(Definition 3 only deals with the case where a single s is chosen and A is given access to a single set of linearly related oracles, but a standard hybrid argument shows that security against linear related-key attacks holds when two s's are chosen and A is given access to two sets of linearly related oracles.) Intuitively, A will (implicitly) use s as the inactive key on outgoing wire j, and s as the inactive key on outgoing wire j ; also, A will (implicitly) useâ k ,b k as the pairwise-independent hash for the kth ingoing wire to which outgoing wire j is connected, and will (implicitly) useâ k ,b k as the pairwise-independent hash for the kth ingoing wire to which outgoing wire j is connected. In this way A can generate a distribution that is identical to H i * −1 when c = 0, and is identical to H i * when c = 1; computational indistinguishability of H i * −1 and H i * follows.
The details are straightforward, though tedious. (6), encrypting only the active key on outgoing wire + g. If both ingoing wires to g are connected to outgoing wires other than j or j , then A can easily compute the garbled gate by itself using the keys it knows. (Note in particular that this holds when g is the gate whose outgoing wire is j or j itself, since A knows the active key on those wires. Recall that any such g must satisfy g < i * by our assumption that the gates are topologically ordered.) Namely, A chooses random (5), and computes GG g as in (6) .
When one of the ingoing wires to g is connected to j or j , however, A must use one of its oracles to generate the garbled gate. By way of example, say the left ingoing wire to g is connected to outgoing wire j, and that g is the kth gate to which outgoing wire j is connected
g as before (it can do this since it knows both keys on the outgoing wire that is connected to the right ingoing wire of g), and computes 
where the ciphertexts are in random permuted order.
The other three possible sub-cases are handled analogously. Briefly:
1. Say the right ingoing wire of g is connected to outgoing wire j, and let k be such that g is the kth gate to which outgoing wire j is connected
g are computed normally (that is, as in (5)), and R b g is computed as R b g =â k s b j +b k . Encryption using R 1−b g , however, is done using oracle access to sEnc
2. Say the left ingoing wire of g is connected to outgoing wire j . Let k be such that g is the kth gate to which outgoing wire j is connected 3. If the right ingoing wire of g is connected to outgoing wire j , and k is such that g is the kth gate to which outgoing wire j is connected, then L 0 g , L 1 g are computed as in (5), R b g is computed as R b g =â k s b j +b k , and encryption using R 1−b g is done using oracle access to sEnc
We assume for simplicity (and without loss of generality) that only gate i * has its incoming wires connected to both j and j , though in fact this assumption is not needed for the proof.
Case 2: g = i * . Let k, k be such that i * is the kth gate to which outgoing wire j is connected, and the k th gate to which outgoing wire j is connected.
is the active key on outgoing wire j [resp., j ]. Thus, L is the active key on the left ingoing wire to gate i * , and R is the active key on the right ingoing wire to gate i * .) Let s 0 +i * and s 1 +i * be the keys on the outgoing wire i * that exits gate i * , and let s * def = s
denote the active key on that wire. Next, A computes four ciphertexts C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 as follows:
It then uses one of its oracles to obtain
• A uses one of its oracles to obtain
, s * ), and then computes
, s * ), and then uses another one of its oracles to obtain
That is, A implicitly usesâ k s +b k as the inactive key on the left ingoing wire to i * , and implicitly usesâ k s +b k as the inactive key on the right ingoing wire to i * . Finally, A outputs GG i * = {C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 }, where the ciphertexts are in random permuted order.
This case is conceptually similar to case 1, with the difference being that here A always constructs garbled gates as in the real protocol. Once again, if both ingoing wires to g are connected to outgoing wires other than j or j , then A can easily compute the garbled gate by itself using the keys it knows. (Note that here it cannot be the case that j or j is the outgoing wire from g, since the gates are topologically ordered.) When one of the ingoing wires to g is connected to j or j , however, A must use one of its oracles to generate the garbled gate. By way of example, say the left ingoing wire to g is connected to outgoing wire j, and that g is the kth gate to which outgoing wire j is connected
g as usual (it can do this since it knows both keys on the outgoing wire that is connected to the right ingoing wire of g), and computes L b g =â k s b j +b k . Letting s 0 +g , s 1 +g be the keys on outgoing wire g , adversary A constructs four ciphertexts as
). It then uses its oracle to compute
where the ciphertexts are randomly permuted. The other sub-cases are handled as in case 1, above.
The only dependence on c in the above is in the construction of garbled gate i * . Indeed, the first i * − 1 garbled gates are constructed as in (6), with four encryptions of the active key on the outgoing wire of the gate, and the last n − i * + 1 garbled gates are constructed as in the real protocol. As for garbled gate i * , if c = 0 then this is constructed as in the real protocol whereas if c = 1 then it is constructed as in (6) . As claimed, then, if c = 0 then the output of A is distributed identically to H i * −1 while if c = 1 then the output of A is distributed as in H i * . Computational indistinguishability of H i * −1 and H i * follows, and this concludes the proof.
A More Efficient Variant
In this section we describe a more efficient variant of our protocol in which the wire labels are chosen in a coordinated fashion, as in [21] . Unfortunately, we are only able to prove security of the resulting protocol in the random oracle model; see further discussion at the end of this section.
We merely sketch the basic idea. Now, in round 1, P 1 chooses a global random shift r and + n outgoing-wire keys {s 0 i }; it then sets s 1 i = s 0 i + r for all i. The first-round message from P 1 now contains pk and the + n ciphertexts Enc pk (s 0 1 ), . . . , Enc pk (s 0 +n ). For each ingoing wire of the circuit, P 2 does as follows. Say the ingoing wire is connected to outgoing wire j. Then P 2 chooses random a and defines the (encrypted) 0-key for this ingoing wire to be (a re-randomization of) Enc pk (s 0 j + a), where this is computed using the homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme. Thus, if gate i of the circuit has its left ingoing wire connected to outgoing wire j and right ingoing wire connected to outgoing wire k, party P 2 defines the ith encrypted "garbled gate" via
where a i , a i are chosen uniformly at random. Finally, P 2 sends encGG 1 , . . . , encGG n to P 1 . Upon receiving this message, P 1 decrypts each encGG to obtain, for each gate i, the keys
and then prepares a garbled version GG i of this gate as in the previous sections. P 2 can then compute the result as usual. The entire protocol is roughly twice as efficient as the original.
As we have mentioned, however, we are only able to prove security of this modified protocol in the (non-programmable) random oracle model. Although it may appear possible to prove security in the standard model if the symmetric-key encryption scheme satisfies a strong enough definition of security, we were not able to isolate any suitable definition. In particular, correlation robustness [18] does not appear to suffice, since there is a circularity when, e.g., keys s, s + r, s , s + r are used to encrypt keys s and s + r. (Some combination of correlation robustness and circular security appears necessary.) The same issue seems to be present in the works of [21, 28] as well.
Security for Malicious Adversaries
As noted in the Introduction, we can apply zero-knowledge proofs in the standard way [15] to obtain a protocol with linear complexity (and constant round complexity) that is secure against malicious adversaries. However, the resulting protocol is unlikely in practice to out-perform secure computation of universal circuits using efficient protocols for the malicious setting (e.g., [23] ). Here, we sketch a more efficient construction that achieves security against a malicious P 1 only. As in the previous section, our goal here is not to optimize the efficiency of the resulting protocol but rather to illustrate the main ideas.
We continue to assume that P 2 learns the output, however Remark 1 of Section 1.2 applies here as well and so the protocol is easily modified so that only P 1 learns the output.
Protocol Modifications
We introduce the following changes to the protocol described in Section 3.1:
Proof of well-formedness of pk. We require P 1 to prove that the public key pk it sends in round 1 was output by the specified key-generation algorithm Gen. (This step is not necessary if it is possible to efficiently verify whether a given pk could have been output by Gen, as is the case with, e.g., El Gamal encryption.) We remark further that it suffices for the proof to be honest-verifier zero knowledge (since we only require security against a semi-honest P 2 ), and we do not require it to be a proof of knowledge.
The complexity of this step is independent of n.
Validity of outgoing-wire keys.
N denote the ciphertexts sent by P 1 in round 1. (Recall that it is supposed to be the case that C b i = Enc pk (s b i ).) We now require P 1 to prove that (1) each C b i is a well-formed ciphertext with respect to the public key pk (once again, this step is unnecessary if it is possible to efficiently verify validity of ciphertexts, as is the case with El Gamal encryption), and (2) for each i, the ciphertexts C 0 i , C 1 i are encryptions of distinct values. If the encryption scheme is additively homomorphic, and we let s 0 i (resp., s 1 i ) denote the plaintext corresponding to C 0 i (resp., C 1 i ), then P 2 can compute Enc pk (s 0 i − s 1 i ) and the latter step is equivalent to proving that this is not an encryption of 0. Once again, it suffices for these proofs to be honest-verifier zero knowledge and they are not required to be proofs of knowledge.
The complexity of this step is linear in n since the statement being proved can be written as a conjunction of n statements, each of which has size independent of n.
Correctness of garbled circuit construction. We require P 1 to prove correctness of the garbled gates it sends to P 2 in the final round. This amounts to proving, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, that GG i was correctly constructed from encGG i . As before, it suffices for these proofs to be honest-verifier zero knowledge and they are not required to be proofs of knowledge.
The complexity of this step is linear in n since the statement being proved is a conjunction of n statements, each of which has size independent of n. We also note that by using an appropriate homomorphic encryption scheme and symmetric-key encryption scheme, these proofs can be made (reasonably) efficient using the techniques of Jarecki and Shmatikov [20] (who show efficient proofs for exactly this purpose, assuming a common reference string, using a variant of the CamenischShoup encryption scheme [7] ).
Correctness of input-wire and output-wire keys. Finally, P 1 is required to prove that the input-wire and output-wire keys it sends in the final round are correct. be the values sent by P 1 in the last round. Then P 1 must prove that: (1) that for each index i ∈ {1, . . . , }, one of the ciphertexts C 0 i , C 1 i is an encryption of the plaintext s i , and (2) that for each index i ∈ {N −m+1, . . . , N }, the ciphertext C 0 i (resp., C 1 i ) is an encryption of s 0 i (resp., s 1 i ). It suffices for each of these proofs to be honest-verifier zero knowledge; the first set of proofs (proving correctness of the input-wire keys) must be proofs of knowledge to allow for input extraction. (Alternately, if the proof of well-formedness of the public key is a proof of knowledge then proofs of knowledge are not needed here.)
The complexity of this step is linear in + m.
We remark that most of the above proofs can be implemented efficiently for any homomorphic encryption scheme. The main exception is the proof of correctness of the garbled circuit construction; however, as noted already, there exists at least one specific homomorphic encryption scheme for which this step can be done reasonably efficiently [20] .
Proof of Security
Theorem 5 Under the same assumptions as in Theorem 4, the protocol of Figure 1 with the modifications described in the previous section is a secure C-PFE protocol for a malicious P 1 .
Proof: Security for a semi-honest P 2 follows from Theorem 4, since all the proofs added to the protocol are honest-verifier zero knowledge.
We briefly sketch the proof of security for a malicious P 1 , assuming the reader has already gone through the proof of Theorem 4. Consider the following simulator S 1 that is given black-box to P 1 and acts as follows: it receives the round 1 message from P 1 , and verifies the relevant proofs given by P 1 showing that pk is valid and that each pair C 0 i , C 1 i encrypts distinct plaintexts. If any of these proofs fails, S 1 simply aborts. Otherwise, S 1 generates a second-round message as in the proof of Theorem 4; i.e., for i = 1 to n the simulator chooses random r 0 , r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , computes 
and gives encGG 1 , . . . , encGG n to P 1 . S 1 receives the third-round message from P 1 and verifies the relevant proofs given by P 1 . If any of these proofs fails, S 1 aborts. Otherwise, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , } the simulator extracts (using the fact that the relevant proof here is a proof of knowledge) a bit x i such that C x i i is an encryption of s i , the ith input-wire value sent by P 1 . (If extraction of any of these bits fails, S 1 aborts.) It sets x = x 1 · · · x and sends x to the trusted party, and outputs whatever P 1 outputs. This completes the simulation.
Computationally indistinguishability of the simulation just described and the view of P 1 in a real execution of the protocol follows from the following observations:
• Assuming the proofs given by P 1 after the first round all succeed, with all but negligible probability it holds that (1) pk is a valid public key and (2) each pair C 0 i , C 1 i encrypts distinct plaintexts. Assuming these to be the case then, as in the proof of Theorem 4, the second-round message generated by S 1 is identically distributed to the second-round message that would be sent in an honest execution of the protocol. (As in the proof of that theorem, this follows from pairwise independence of the mapping used by an honest P 2 .)
• Assuming the proofs given by P 1 after the third round all succeed, with all but negligible probability it holds that (1) each garbled gate was computed correctly; (2) P 1 sent valid input-wire labels; and (3) P 1 sent valid output-wire labels. Moreover, with all but negligible probability, for each x i extracted by S 1 it holds that C
i is an encryption of s i and so s i is the key corresponding to bit x i on input wire i. (Note further that it cannot be that C 1−x i i is also an encryption of s i , since P 1 proved is round 1 that C 0 i , C 1 i encrypt distinct plaintexts.) It follows that the real P 2 would output C f (x), which is identical to the output of P 2 in the ideal world.
This completes the proof.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have shown the first constant-round protocol for PFE with complexity linear in the size of the circuit being computed (without relying on fully homomorphic encryption). Our results leave several interesting open questions:
• In addition to its theoretical importance, we believe our work is also of practical relevance: specifically, we expect that our approach to PFE will be both easier to implement and more efficient (for large circuits) than approaches relying on universal circuits. It remains to experimentally validate this claim.
• Our work leaves open the question of designing a fully secure protocol for PFE (i.e., PFE with security against a malicious P 1 and a malicious P 2 ) with linear complexity that would have better performance than what results from running a secure computation of universal circuits using efficient protocols for the malicious setting (e.g., [23] ).
• It would also be interesting to improve the cryptographic assumptions needed for our results: e.g., to construct a protocol based on semantically secure symmetric-key encryption (without requiring related-key security), or to avoid the use of homomorphic public-key encryption.
